Implications of Discretionary Retirement Benefits: Evidence from India



# A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FELLOW PROGRAMME IN MANAGEMENT

#### INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT INDORE

BY

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February, 2019

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#### **Abstract**

The Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions (EPF&MP) Act, 1952 provides for a government mandated wage-ceiling over which employers are not required to contribute for retirement benefits for enrolled employees. We term contributions over the wage-ceiling as discretionary. Discretionary retirement benefit expenses borne by firms are sticky downwards and are a positive function of time. As a result, the present value of discretionary contributions to be paid by a firm would be much higher than what it would be if it had just paid following the wage-ceiling mandated by the statute. In this research, we are trying to answer why firms commit to offer discretionary contributions when they could have easily escaped with a much lesser financial burden. Whether such expenses bring some desirable outcomes? We have divided the research at two levels as per the unit of analysis – firms, and individuals. In the first study we look at the impact of discretionary contribution on firm performance, and in the second, we explore the relationship between such expenses and individual level attitudinal outcomes of organizational commitment and job satisfaction.

The first paper looks at the deferred profit-sharing plans (PSPs) and uses the gift-exchange model to draw informed parallels with discretionary retirement benefit expenses. The former provides us with empirical findings as regards firm performance, while the latter gives us theoretical lenses to study the phenomena. We also explore the linkage between discretionary retirement benefits, corporate image, and firm performance. As in the case of PSPs, we test the association between discretionary retirement expenses paid by firms on behalf of their employees and firms' financial performance. We analysed a panel data of 16141 firm-year observations of publicly listed Indian companies over the period 1990-2016. Results indicate that such expenses are indeed associated with firms' financial performance positively and significantly, whether an accounting or a market-expectation based measure is considered. The results obtained are robust to alternate measures of firms' financial performance or retirement benefit expenses. We also tested for endogeneity and ran the two-stage least square (2-SLS) procedure to confirm our findings.

In the second paper, we carried out a field survey to see whether discretionary contribution led to organizational commitment and job satisfaction. Based on the responses from 471 employees in 24 establishments that are covered under the EPF&MP Act, we found that awareness of discretionary contribution was significantly related to affective commitment and job satisfaction for firms that actually paid such contributions. For firms that paid only up to the mandated wage ceiling, the awareness of discretionary contribution lost its significance. We also found that financial literacy was positively and significantly associated with awareness of retirement benefits. We further established that financial literacy significantly affected the affective and normative commitments and also job satisfaction through the mediating role played by the awareness about the discretionary contribution when firms actually extended such benefits.

Keywords: Discretionary Retirement Benefits, Financial Performance, Profit Share Plans, Corporate Reputation, Gift Exchange, Organizational Commitment, Job Satisfaction, Overall Fairness Perception, Financial Knowledge, Financial Behavior, Financial Attitude

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