

**INVESTIGATING THE CONCENTRATION OF
BEHAVIORAL DARK SIDE LEADING TO DISRUPTION IN
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES**



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ABSTRACT

The extant literature defines the consequential impact of the dark side in terms of uncertainties and unrest, failure to exchange information, tension and discomfort due to contradictory goals and the inherent conflicts at the firm-level dyadic. Literature indicates that the dark side, often motivated by opportunism (Williamson, 1985) despite comprehensive explication of rights, duties, obligations, and other provisions within the aforesaid dyad, jeopardizes exchanges. Disrupted exchanges affect firms' operations, performance, and ultimately their competitive advantages. However, literature has (i) fallen short in providing a precise definition for the dark side, (ii) largely overlooked or provided weak empirical evidence for the antecedents, processes and the outcomes of the dark side, lack of governance choices (Oliveira & Lumineau, 2019) and the other significant part of literature is silent on addressing the effectiveness of governance choices to mitigate the negative impact of dark side effect in a dyad.

Building on the overarching theoretical frameworks of Transaction Costs and Social Exchange Theory, this research steps in to address the above gaps via three essays, that provide (i) an empirical context to highlight the phenomenon and (ii) provide an end-to-end mapping of the antecedents, processes, outcomes, and governance of the dark side spectrum that threaten dyadic exchanges of firms. The first essay seeks to understand the hidden aspects of exploitation as apprehended by (Karnani, 2007) at the Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) against the overarching optimism of (Prahalad, 2005). The second essay attempts to provide a precise definition to the construct of tolerable dark side which is insufficiently explained by the extant literature and has the potential to cast doubts on the continuity of dyadic exchanges as well as the effectiveness of the governance choices.

The third essay provides the precise definition, construct, and governance aspects of the intolerable dark side in the dyadic exchange relationship.

Essay 1

The extant literature suggests that behavioral opportunism renders the exchange relationship ineffective and dysfunctional. In the context of BOP, this implies a dampening of the organization's ability to invest in ventures that endeavor to address poverty and socio-economic constraints. Many authors have concluded that there are exploitative tendencies in the market due to institutional void, illiteracy, and limited consumer activism (Dobers & Halme, 2009). There has also been a reluctance to invest in BOP ventures due to heterogeneity, illiteracy, and weak institutional support leading to nonachievement of scale advantages and instability. There is limited research investigating instability in BOP ventures. Consequently, the first essay explores these dark side forces that create instability in the relationships causing economic losses. Since little is known in this area, recognizing the need to explore the elements of dark side and to bridge the gap in extant literature, this study builds on the behavioral opportunism theory to investigate dark side phenomenon across multiple BOP initiatives, geographies, products, and services in the B2B context. To that end, there are 88 cases considered in the BOP context, drawing from reputed publishers. The fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis method has been used to explicate the various configurations. The result displays seven configurational paths with the potency to destabilize a BOP venture. Based on the findings from the first essay, the remaining two essays are expanded to the realm of tolerable and intolerable dark sides by conducting empirical studies.

Essay 2

The second essay anchors on the literature of Transaction Cost Theory and Social Exchange Theory to explore the manifestations and the consequences of a tolerable dark

side induced task conflict on dissolution intent. It investigates how the presence of a transactional stress created by false promise, passive deception, and misrepresentation leads to task conflict. The combined effects of the above constitute the tolerable dark side and further how tolerable dark side leads to dissolution intent in a firm level dyadic exchange. It also explores the different governance mechanisms that either accentuate or attenuate the effects of tolerable dark side on dissolution intent in a B2B dyad.

Essay 3

The third essay extends the tolerable dark side into the domain of intolerable dark side and its effect in terminating dyadic exchanges. First, it investigates how manipulation, active deception, and betrayal constitute behavioral stress that triggers relational conflict and which as a whole constitutes the intolerable dark side. Second, it examines how the intolerable dark side leads to relationship termination. Third, it also explores the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms to placate or accentuate the disruptive effects of intolerable dark side in a B2B dyad.

Essays two and three use survey method with the help of Qualtrics survey platform. The usable data for both the essays has been obtained from 487 dyadic exchange relationships concerning 974 firms, collected from India-based participants and the survey spanned two months. For the analysis, I used the seemingly unrelated regression method (SUR) as per literature to test the antecedent factors for the respective dark sides and their governance mechanism to moderate the outcomes.

Keywords: *Bottom of the Pyramid Firms, Tolerable Dark Side, Dissolution Intent, Intolerable Darkside, Relationship Termination, Governance Mechanisms.*

Annexure A4: Questionnaire

Sustaining Exchange Relationships

This survey is to understand the relationship challenges between buyer and strategic vendors who are critical for your business.

There are three sections in the questionnaire.

- The first section is about demography.
- Second section is about behavioral aspects of vendors.
- Third section is governance methods to control bad behaviour.

Please read each statement carefully before responding to ensure the accuracy of your response.

Your participation in this study is voluntary and data will be used only for a research purpose.

Note: Material suppliers and service providers are considered as VENDORS in the study.

I Thank you for your time.

Q. 1 Please specify your Gender M F N

Q. 2 Please Select your Qualification.

Under Graduate Postgraduate

Engineering Others

Q. 3 What is your Industry type?

Manufacturing

Services

Consumer Products

Retail

E-Commerce

Others

Q. 4 Please specify your total experience.

1-4 Years 5-10 Years

11-20 Years >20 Years

Q. 5 Please specify your functional experience.

Procurement/Purchase

Sales

Commercial and contract

Vender Management

Legal

Others

Q. 5A Which side of the organisation do you represent?

Customer Organisation (Buyer)

Vendor Organisation (Seller)

None

Q. 6 Please specify your role in decision making.

Final Decision Maker

Decision Enabler

Not Involved in Decision Making

Q. 7 How long is your Organization existing?

5-15 16-25 >25

Following **questions Q8 to Q14 represent vendors' opportunistic behaviour** while they are working with your organization.

There is no right or wrong answers of the following statements. It just shows your perception about the statement.

Statement 8 (False promise): The below describes **promises made by vendors to meet deliverables**.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7							
8.1 Vendor agrees to perform on paper but violates it later (FALSP3)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8.2 Vendor commits to do things without actually doing them later (FALSP4)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8.3 Vendor promises superior performance without an intention of performing it (FALSP1)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8.4 Vendor gives false information about various aspects of work (FALF3)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8.5 Vendor intentionally hides factual information related to the contract (FALF1)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Statement 9 (Deception): Your observation on **selective behaviour of vendor to meet contractual obligations**.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7							
9.1 Vendor tries to avoid performing contractual obligations (DECP13)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9.2 Vendor conceals his poor performance (MISR7)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9.3 Vendor does not share facts , when its advantageous to us (MISR9)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9.4 Vendor makes empty promises without an intention to meet it (DECP11)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Statement 10 (Betrayal): Below are the statements of vendor **exploitation at a crucial period of your business needs**.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7							
10.1 Vendor often fails to provide expected support when we are in need (BRT5)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10.2 Vendor lets us down by his dishonest behavior (BRT3)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10.3 We have found vendor disclosing confidential information to others (BRT1)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10.4 Sometimes vendor is disloyal to us (BRT2)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10.5 We have lost faith as a result of exploitative behaviour by vendor (BRT4)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Statement 11 (Misrepresentation): Below are the statements about vendor **Sharing Critical information**. Please choose appropriate option.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7							
11.1 Vendor purposefully misrepresents performance related measure in order to take advantage of us (MISR1)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11.2 Vendor denies the validity of information given by him in the past (MISR3)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11.3 Vendor Intentionally misquotes the progress of the activities (MISR4)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11.4 Vendor misrepresents certain facts (eg. skills, price, capacities) at the time of negotiations (MISR10)							1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Statement 12 (Deception): Following are **doubtful/ambiguous responses** related to vendor deliverables.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

12.1 Vendor fails to meet the deliverables as per the contract (DECP1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12.2 Vendor gives us false information about deviations (DECP6)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12.3 Vendor avoids performing his responsibilities unless monitored closely (DECP2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12.4 Vendor lies about the deliverables in order to protect his interest (DECP3)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12.5 Vendor deceives us in critical performance area as required by contract (DECP7)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Statement 13 (Manipulation): The following statements depicts the **manipulative behaviour** of the vendor

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

13.1 Vendor alters the facts in order to meet his performance objectives (MANU4)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13.2 Vendor manipulates contractual data (MANU1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13.3 Vendor fails to provide correct information about the deviations noticed (MANU8)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13.4 Vendor charges extra from us to correct mistakes (MANU7)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Statement 14 Conflict (Relational conflicts): Following describe **Ongoing Relationship Quality** with vendor. Please choose appropriate option.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

14.1 There are unreasonable demands made by the vendor (CLFT5)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.2 The working relationship with the vendor is very stressful (CLFT6)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

14.3 There are conflicts with vendors in working relationship (CLFT8)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.4 There are often disagreements with vendor concerning the relationship (CLFT7)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.5 We noticed cultural difference with vender organization (CLFT14)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Following **questions Q15 to Q20** describe your organization’s governance methods **to deal with varying degree of opportunism** shown by vendor. Please select the appropriate option.

Statement 15 (Interest based Governance): Following are the **approaches to manage day-to-day function** of vendor. Please choose appropriate option.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

15.1 We take consensus-based approach to solve contractual problems (CG15)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15.2 We address differences with the vendors for the mutual benefits (CG16)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15.3 We uphold common interest in case of disputes with vendor. (CG17)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15.4 We settle disagreements amicably with vendors. (CG19)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15.5 We go beyond contracts and help vendors (AMBT10)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Statement 16 (Tolerance): How do you see the **Relationship tolerance** with vendor when you encounter performance deviations (e.g. **Mistakes, non-performance of activities**). Please choose appropriate option.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

16.1 We are patient with the vendor even if they make mistakes (AMBT25)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16.2 We are willing to dedicate people and resources to meet our commercial success (AMBT26)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

16.3 We are willing to make long-term investments with the vendor. (AMBT27)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16.4. If the vendor holds back useful information, we would not consider leaving him (AMBT15)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16.5 We are not continually on the lookout for replacing this vendor (AMBT28)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Statement 17 (Ambiguity Tolerance): How to you view **contractual clarity** with vendor (e.g. Details of scope, performance parameters, and penalty etc.).

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neutral	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

17.1 Nothing gets done by the vendor unless we stick to some basic rules (AMBT9)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17.2 There's a right and a wrong-way to perform everything as per the contract (AMBT5)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17.3 Organization does not work with vendor when there is no clear-cut answer to the problems (AMBT11)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17.4 Contractual Compliance is vital to our organization. (AMBT29)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17.5 Failure to perform contractual functions has a serious consequence (AMBT30)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Statement 18 (Right Based Governance): How do you establish **contractual rights** over your vendor.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

18.1 We demand periodic written reports from vendor about the performance. (CG21)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18.2 We send notice to vendor in case of significant deviations (CG22)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18.3 We have included "right to examine and audit" of all relevant records of the vendor (CG23)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

18.4 We have specific **clauses to a violation** of the contract (CG30) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

18.5 We have included **termination clauses** for ending contracts prior to original date. (CG26) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Statement 19 (Enforcement): How your organizations deal with **repeated failures of vendor performance**. Please choose appropriate option.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7

19.1 Our organization **does not compromise** on quality of deliverables (CG10) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

19.2 **Inadequate performance** of vendor will be viewed seriously (CG31) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

19.3 Our organization **responds firmly to non-performance** of vendors (CG7) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

19.4 Our organization takes tough measures **in case of a major breach** of contract (CG6) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

19.5 There are **penalties** applied for contractual breaches (CG9) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Statement 20 (Institutional support): How do you view **Courts/Tribunal's effectiveness for a dispute resolution** with vendor.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7

20.1 **Legal system ensures accuracy** of delivery obligations by vendor (INS3) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

20.2 Legal system helps resolve **transactional disputes** with vendor (e.g. price differences, product/service deficiency, warranty etc.) (INS5) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

20.3 **Legal system protects** of our **investments** (INS2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

20.4 **Legal system protects our interest** in case of a dispute with the vendor (INS1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

20.5 The legal system prevents us from **being cheated** by vendor (INS4) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Statement 21 (Dissolution intention): Your responses to **failures noticed in the vendors' performance.**

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7

21.1 If vendor **delivers products of lower quality** than our firm require, we will consider leaving the current vendor (DISS6) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

21.2 If this vendor **holds back information** that could be useful to us, we will consider leaving the current vendor (DISS7) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

21.3 If this vendor **demand too high prices**, we will consider leaving the current vendor (DISS8) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

21.4 If this vendor **does not respond to correct failures**, we would consider to leave the current Vendor (DISS9) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

21.5 We are looking for a **replacement of vendor.** (DISS2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Statement 22 (Termination): Your response to **Significant Violations committed** by vendor.

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7

22.1 Vendor's **Manipulative behavior** reduced our enthusiasm to continue in future (DISG1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

22.2 Vendor's **conflicting approach** makes us less involved in engaging with him (DISG2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

22.3 We end the relationship when vendor involves in **deceptive practices** (DISS3) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

22.4 We exit the relationship when vendor involves in **Misrepresentation of facts** (DISS1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

22.5 We are likely to **terminate the relationship** due to significant violation to the contract (TER2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Statement 23: Availability of alternative suppliers) control variable:

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
<input type="checkbox"/> 1	<input type="checkbox"/> 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 3	<input type="checkbox"/> 4	<input type="checkbox"/> 5	<input type="checkbox"/> 6	<input type="checkbox"/> 7

23. If this supplier relationship is dissolved, then other firms can deliver what we buy from this supplier. (ALTR1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**** THANK YOU ****

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